

Elixir Europe

Powered, Palpable and Popular

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Abstract

We construct an issue tree of Europe's economy to prioritise, devise and defend five ready-to-sell policies to oxygenise European growth within five years.

Key targets are innovation, regulation, labour, trade, energy, digital education and Europeans' collective psyche. We also sketch out an actionable stakeholder strategy with packaging and persuasion tactics.

We focus on two elements: *effectiveness* (direct impact on growth) and *implementability*, in terms of costs and available political resources by 2020 at the national and EU levels.

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Elixir Europe: Powered, Palpable and Popular

Introduction.

The next James Bond will be him stuck for two hours at passport control in De Gaulle.

A post-traumatic stress response, group therapy or semi-spiritual epiphany, the 2007 Brexit joke is as frivolous as what European politics have become: a binary dilemma, for or against. Marine Le Pen asserts that you can only be a ‘patriot’ or a ‘globalist’¹ – read: for the nation, or for Europe.

This situation, symptomatic of a rejection of the EU’s elite *cognoscenti*, echoes old Italy when the Venetian Senate decreed in 1511: ‘Henceforth no new fashion that may be imagined or told shall be suffered’². On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Europe, fashionable in the fifties, has ceased to be suffered. Cities and citizens increasingly rebuff the *Vieux Continent*.

After the mythical Europa rode on Zeus’ shoulders through the ‘receding sands’³, present Europe now sits on a grotesque beach, contemplating the floating remnants of a ‘poly-crisis’⁴: Brexit, Germany’s private investment shortage and *Mittelstand*’s aging⁵, Croatia’s plunging trade balance⁶, migration, Italy’s tanking productivity despite its successful Treu/Biagi labour reforms in 1997-2003⁷, and an ossified TTIP deal⁸.

¹ *The Economist*, Charlemagne, ‘Commented out’ (25 June 2016)

² T. Okey, *The Old Venetian Palaces and Old Venetian Folk* (1907), p. 281

³ Ovid, *Metamorphoses* (8 AD), Book II, Verses 847-67: ‘The Abduction of Europa’

⁴ Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Parliament Plenary Session, *Conclusions of the European Council Meeting of 17-18 December 2015* (Brussels, 19 January 2016)

⁵ *Lettre Trésor-Eco*, ‘Is Private Investment Too Weak in Germany?’ (July 2016), n°172

⁶ European Commission, *European Economic Forecast* (Winter 2016), p. 87

⁷ *Lettre Trésor-Eco*, ‘How to Explain the Low Productivity in Italy?’ (May 2016), n°170

⁸ *Financial Times*, ‘EU-US trade: Five reasons why a deal looks difficult’ (25 April 2016)

Europe's major illness is that it is not myopic. There has been too much long-run strategizing to propel the European wagon on a high-road strategy (Europe 2020, Horizon 2020) but not enough myopic operational moves to actually ignite the motor. Therefore, this essay recommends '*Elixir Europe*', a bold €5bn, five-pillar growth programme to make Europe a powered, palpable (local impact) and popular bloc by 2020.

Given this short timeframe, *Elixir* refrains from the feel-good-fly-high mainstream ideals (e.g. Eurobonds, fiscal harmonisation, 'ever-closer-union'). Although growth enablers, they simply cannot be politically implemented within current electoral cycles. Our four-year timeline necessarily calls for modesty and focus. A proper growth strategy is a strategy that chooses what *not* to do⁹.


Thus, building on the *acquis* of existing EU policies, we should implement *more precise* prescriptions to create more economic granularity and stronger *solidarité de fait*¹⁰. This essay shows how.

⁹ Cardinal Mazarin, *Breviary of Politicians* (1684), Book 2, p. 42

¹⁰ Declaration of Jean Monnet in Paris (9 May 1950)

Appendix A: Issue Tree for European Growth

Mutually Exclusive, Collectively Exhaustive Improvement Levers



PART I

The Science of Delivering Europe's Economics: You Can't Make an Omelette Without Breaking a Few Eggs

'How can you expect a man to comprehend, in the first hour of digestion, that others may somewhere perish of hunger?'

— La Bruyère, *Les Caractères* (1696)

The same goes for the EU's economic policy. After the opening of Euroland, the Single Market, European Stability Mechanism (emergency liquidity) and Juncker's Plan (€315bn investments), few expect the EU, still digesting these important reforms, to comprehend that a few more eggs should be broken.

Here's what could still be done in the European economic kitchen.

I. So, Blue or Red Pill? Austerity and Growth

The methodology of the flagship, pro-growth Europe 2020¹¹ remains problematic: its lax peer-pressure mechanism ('Open Method of Coordination') proved utterly ineffective in creating pressure to reform¹². Moreover, 12 EU Prime Ministers devised a European 'growth plan' without even mentioning Europe 2020¹³.

Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the austerity and growth 'packs' and 'pacts'¹⁴, including the 3%-deficit/60%-debt targets, didn't quite re-boost Europe. They helped. But they added legal complexity, were repeatedly breached and are constantly fought over, which drains political capital that could be spent elsewhere.

¹¹ European Commission, 'Europe 2020': http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm

¹² European Political Strategy Centre, *Strategic Note* 'Europe 2020: From Indicators and Targets to Performance and Delivery' (30 September 2015), Issue 6

¹³ Joint Letter to President Van Rompuy and President Barroso (20 February 2012): <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-plan-for-growth-in-europe>

¹⁴ 'Six-Pack', 'Stability and Growth Pact' (SGP), 'Fiscal Compact'. See European Commission, 'Six-Pack? Two-Pack? Fiscal Compact? A Short Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance' (26 July 2013)

In this impasse, Matrix’s Morpheus asks us: ‘blue, or red pill’¹⁵? Growth-but-austerity plans that are half-implemented and lack citizen support, or precise and politically feasible policies? Plato’s mythical cave¹⁶ or Kant’s real *phenomenon*¹⁷? In short, reform or perform?

II. The EU’s Favourite Punching Bag: Regulation and Innovation

Symptoms

Following the 1979 *Cassis de Dijon* ruling on common standards¹⁸, the EU has punched and squeezed the regulation bag fairly firm. The 2006 Services Directive curtailed by 25% regulatory heterogeneity¹⁹, reducing administrative compliance costs to only 1.5% GDP for countries like Britain, Finland and Sweden²⁰.

Since 2005, it has repealed 5,500+ inefficient rules and launched the ‘REFIT’ platform²¹ to lighten EU law through fitness checks. The 2018 Data Regulation²² also harmonises legislations.

Astonishingly however, Denmark and Estonia’s intra-national trades remain respectively 9 and 15 times higher than their international trade despite their Single Market regulatory advantage²³. Regulatory efforts have improved but not solved Europe’s investment gap: investments remain 17% below pre-crisis levels²⁴.

Moreover, EU rules may prove clumsily incompatible with new technologies. It took two years to adapt EU law to LED lights²⁵, thus inhibiting Europe’s green economy for more than 700 days.

¹⁵ *The Matrix* by The Wachowskis, ‘The Pill Scene’ (1999)

¹⁶ Plato, Πολιτεία (*The Republic*), 380 BC, para. 514a–520a

¹⁷ I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*), 1781, Book III: ‘Transcendental Doctrine of Elements’, para. A369

¹⁸ European Court of Justice, *Reve-Zentral*, ‘Cassis de Dijon’ (1979), C120/78

¹⁹ J. Monteagudo, A. Rutkowski & D. Lorenzani, ‘The Economic Impact of the Services Directive: A First Assessment Following Implementation’, *Economic Papers* (2012), n°456

²⁰ *Lettre Trésor-Eco*, ‘Why and How to Deepen the European Single Market Today’ (October 2015),

²¹ European Commission, ‘REFIT – Regulatory Fitness and Performance’ (2015): Results and Next Steps’, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions* (2 October 2013)

²² European Commission, ‘General Data Protection Regulation’ (14 April 2016)

²³ H. Braconier *et al.*, ‘Road Connectivity and the Border Effect: Evidence from Europe’, *OECD Working Papers* (2013), n°1073

²⁴ European Investment Bank (EIB), *Investment and Investment Finance in Europe: Key Findings* (2013), p. 2

²⁵ European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), *Strategic Note ‘Towards an Innovation Principle Endorsed by Better Regulation’* (30 June 2016), Issue 14

By actively incentivising and investing in innovation instead of passively regulating it, we could spur growth through two channels in the real economy. On the demand side, better products/services stimulate consumer spending, which is the main EU growth driver – up to 90% of Czech growth²⁶.

On the supply side, since innovation unlocks comparative advantages²⁷, we would improve Europe's trade competitiveness and energise its exports.

Antidote n°1

We suggest launching a **Eureka Europe** annual contest, assessed by a jury of independent experts.

The winning prize will be €500m for the best new product/service for European consumers and for growth. This enshrines article 169 TFEU (promoting 'consumers' interests')²⁸ and article 3 TEU (promoting 'technological advance')²⁹.

The winner is *bound* to re-invest within one year *half* of the cash to expand her business internationally in order to create trade & foreign investments spillovers for Europe. *Eureka* thus complements and enhances the EU's *COSME* programme³⁰, which improves businesses' access to finance and markets.

In addition:

- €150m for the best innovation from a 'moderate innovator' country according to the *Innovation Union Scoreboard* (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Spain with innovation scores similar to developing Serbia's³¹) to reinforce innovation across Europe

- €150m and fast-track procedure at the European Patent Office for a project that improves/reinvents *service delivery*, because another key to unleash growth is to unleash services, which constitute 75% of Europe's economy³².

- *Solve-Me* spinoff: each year, Member States select the 3 most critical opportunities for European growth (e.g. migration) and the best *ad-hoc* solutions from the private sector are awarded a €150m pool prize.

²⁶ European Commission, *European Economic Forecast* (Winter 2016), p. 27 and p. 70

²⁷ D. Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), Chapter VII: 'On Foreign Trade', p. 77; A. Atkeson & A. Burstein, 'Innovation, Firm Dynamics, and International Trade', *Journal of Political Economy* (2010), 118(3), pp. 433-489

²⁸ Article 169, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

²⁹ Article 3, Treaty of the European Union (TEU)

³⁰ EU Regulation n°1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11 December 2013)

³¹ European Commission, 'Innovation Union Scorecard' (IUS), 2015: <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards/>

³² Source: *Eurostat*

- *Mayors-Race* spinoff: €50m for the European city that incubates the best EU start-ups. Half of which to be injected in successful local start-ups & incubator spaces to expand, the other half in city infrastructure improvements at the mayor's discretion. The long-run objectives are to stimulate better infrastructure (hence productivity) and beget a European network of Berlin-style business boomtowns³³.

Finally, finalists will get a one-year permit to *test* any new product/service which clashes with EU regulation. This is designed to amplify the geographical impact of Britain's *Regulatory Sandbox* and France's *Expérimentation* programs, which temporarily grant a relaxed regulatory framework for certain breakthrough products.

This will incentivise participation, ensure Europe-wide research spillovers and alleviate the private sector's perception that EU innovation budgets are too heavily specified/regulated.

Essentially, *Eureka* is a €1bn, crossbreed investment-regulation-trade-innovation policy. It has three advantages.

One is the congruence with the authoritative Sapir Report³⁴, which recommended innovative disruption to boost Europe Inc. Among the top 50 firms worldwide, only 7 are European due to insufficient innovation³⁵.

Two, *Eureka* is legally solid and politically sound. By complying with the legal subsidiarity principle³⁶ (legitimising EU-level action by reason of scale) while being non-legislative, it neutralises the Eurosceptics' *too-much-Europe* narrative.

Three, it is grounded on the robust 'Responsive Regulation' theory³⁷, since it seeks not to punish but to *expand* regulatees' strengths and incentives. As demonstrated by *Freakonomics*³⁸ and Japan's 'top-runner' benchmarking approach³⁹, people respond to incentives. And each year, *Eureka Europe* creates a forceful incentive to create.

³³ McKinsey & Company, *Public Sector Insights*, 'Scaling a Start-up Community: An Interview with Berlin's Mayor' (July 2014)

³⁴ A. Sapir *et al.*, *An Agenda for a Growing Europe: Making the EU Economic System Deliver* (July 2003)

³⁵ *The Economist*, 'From Clout to Rout: Why European Companies Have Become a Fading Force in Global Business' (2 July 2016)

³⁶ Article 5(3), Treaty of the European Union (TEU)

³⁷ I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, *Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate* (1992)

³⁸ S. Dubner & S. Levitt, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* (2005)

³⁹ O. Kimura, 'Japanese Top Runner Approach for Energy Efficiency Standards', *SERC Discussion Paper* (2010)

III. The Invisible Gorilla Effect: Employment and Education

Symptoms

A famous psychological experiment in 1999 had participants watch footage and count basketball passes made by a team wearing white shirts. Midway through, a gorilla-suited person appeared in the centre of the screen for *nine* seconds. Staggeringly, half the viewers didn't notice the gorilla⁴⁰.

This selective attention bias also affects most European governments when it comes to labour markets. There is indeed a fixating perception that the problem is quantitative without noticing the gorilla-big rebutting reality: empirically, potential European labour supply remains copious⁴¹.

The labour pool encompasses migrants (Britain's *Transitions* company successfully connects UK employers to graduate refugees⁴²), part-time young workers yearning for extra-hours (France's *Loi Macron* is to allow work on Sundays⁴³) and silver workers (Denmark raised the retirement age to 72 years, the OECD's highest⁴⁴).

The problem is not so much quantitative. The problem is qualitative: shifting labour *structures* and skill gaps are currently two major impediments to European growth⁴⁵. They are correctible within 3-5 years through a hybrid employment & education policy.

Antidote n°2

1) Launch a Europe-wide app *JobAroundMe (JAM)*, developed by the private sector (top European app-developer like Ribot/Somo⁴⁶) in cooperation with Commissioners Oettinger (Digital Economy) and Katainen (Jobs) for promotional/co-financing purposes. Smartphone use is widespread in Europe (in Spain, 70% have one⁴⁷), which ensures sufficient reachability.

⁴⁰ C. Chabris & D. Simons, *The Invisible Gorilla: How Our Intuitions Deceive Us* (2011)

⁴¹ S. Marth, 'How Strong is the Correlation Between Unemployment and Growth Really? The Persistence of Okun's Law and How to Weaken It', *WWWforEurope Policy Paper* (2015), 23

⁴² *The Guardian*, 'Refugees Will Have the Right to Work' (11 September 2015)

⁴³ French Ministry of Labour, 'Le Travail du Dimanche' (18 September 2015)

⁴⁴ Finish Centre for Pensions (*Eläketurvakeskus*), 'Retirement Age in Member States' (5 July 2016)

⁴⁵ European Parliament, *Labour Market Shortages in the European Union* (2015); T. Leoni, 'Welfare State Adjustment to New Social Risks in the Post-Crisis Scenario', *WWWforEurope Working Paper* (2015), 89; W. Altzinger *et al.*, 'Education and Social Mobility in Europe', *WWWforEurope Working Paper* (2015), 80

⁴⁶ *App Index*, 'The World's Best App Development Agencies' (25 February 2015)

⁴⁷ Pew Research Centre, *Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey*, Q71 & Q72

One transversal issue across Europe is the failure to empower the mega-trend of a young, part-time economy (think Uber, Airbnb). Europe's working structures have changed from the *Trente Glorieuses*' lifelong-contracts in assembly lines⁴⁸ to outsourced 'nonstandard-work', exemplified by the Saturday gig of your local babysitter. Temporary hires constitute 85% of France's employees⁴⁹.

This shift, acknowledged by the German⁵⁰ and French⁵¹ governments, hasn't been concretely responded to: European youth unemployment is still 20%⁵², costing the EU €150bn each year in lost tax contributions⁵³.

The public-private app would espouse this new labour reality by enabling people to upload their skills profile (supply side), other persons their needs such as local babysitting/hairdressing/plumbing (similar to TaskRabbit but Europe-specific) and employers their company vacancies. Like Tinder-style dating apps, both swipe right/left to match with people in their vicinity. A 'match' would mean a need matched by quick local labour⁵⁴.

Free to use, *JAM* empowers formal and informal (gig) labour markets without traditional tax incentives (bad for public deficits). By ensuring easier supply-demand matches and thus shaking off current labour market rigidities, it will incentivise work and stimulate aggregate consumer spending.

As evidence suggests, that would translate into higher economic growth⁵⁵ and investor confidence⁵⁶. Moreover, *JAM* is grounded on Amartya Sen's capability theory by giving people more labour capabilities and enhancing equality of opportunity⁵⁷.

⁴⁸ *Harvard Business Review*, 'The Rise of the Supertemp' (May 2012); European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), *Strategic Note* 'The Future of Work: Skills and Resilience for a World of Change' (10 June 2016), Issue 13

⁴⁹ French Ministry of Labour and Employment, *Dares Indicateurs* n°88 (November 2014)

⁵⁰ German Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, *Green Paper Arbeit 4.0* (2015)

⁵¹ France Stratégie, 'L'avenir du travail: quelles redéfinitions de l'emploi, des statuts et des protections?' (2016)

⁵² Source: *Eurostat*

⁵³ *Eurofound*, Publications Office of the European Union, 'NEETs – Young people not in employment, education or training: Characteristics, costs and policy responses in Europe' (2012)

⁵⁴ Personal settings will also enable the user to 'filter', e.g. search potential employees with car industry experience, or search jobs in the tech industry.

⁵⁵ A. Dutt, 'Aggregate Demand, Aggregate Supply, and Economic Growth', *International Review of Applied Economics* (2006)

⁵⁶ European Commission, *Staff Working Document*, 'Better Regulations for Innovation-Driven Investment at EU level' (15 December 2015), SWD, 298 final

⁵⁷ A. Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities* (1985); A. Sen, *Development as Freedom* (2001)

2) To complement *JAM* and further boost the job market, we propose three non-legislative programmes, open to volunteering Member States:

- **European Start-Up Visa:** diluting non-tariff barriers to trade/employment⁵⁸
- **European Refugee Visa:** accelerate migrants' professional insertion
- **Erasmus Job:** increase workers' mobility, training and youth employment⁵⁹

3) Second, create a **European Digital Education (EDED)** scheme in partnership with Google to complete the Digital Single Market, complement the 2013 EU Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs and *flexibilise* Europe.

One key dragger to European productivity (i.e. firms' competitiveness) is the IT skills shortage, which Chancellor Merkel termed 'digital anxiety'⁶⁰. 2 out of 3 Italians have low or absent digital competencies⁶¹. Germany has realised only 10% of its digital potential⁶².

This is forecasted to cause 825,000 unfilled vacancies across Europe by 2020⁶³. With a €2,000-2,500 monthly wage average, this means Europe's economy will lose €2bn *each month*. This is like losing the combined Polish, Swedish and Swiss GDPs⁶⁴.

This lack of tech-savviness is empirically correlated to wage losses in the Nordics⁶⁵, thus hurting purchasing power. Furthermore, 40% of European companies remain 'non-digital'⁶⁶. This means they do not use technologies to advance their international business and hence cannot scale. That impairs the bloc's competitiveness in comparison to tech-savvy China and America.

- Effective education-to-employment is one of the 11 competitiveness growth drivers identified by McKinsey⁶⁷. Our one-week *EDED* scheme, including Switzerland/Norway, will segment and train European employers and employees (with a special focus on traditionally-underrepresented groups such as migrants and women) in accordance to their needs: e.g. digital marketing for aspiring PR agents, data mining for product-line managers.

⁵⁸ Similar to the 2015 Dutch visa for start-ups: <http://www.iamsterdam.com/en/expatcenter/latest-news/new-start-up-visa>

⁵⁹ <http://www.delorsinstitute.eu/011-21235-Erasmus-Pro-for-a-million-young-European-apprentices-by-2020.html>

⁶⁰ Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel, 'Tags des deutschen Familienunternehmens' (12 June 2015)

⁶¹ European Commission, *Digital Agenda Scoreboard* (2014)

⁶² McKinsey Global Institute, *Digital Europe: Realizing the Continent's Potential* (June 2016)

⁶³ European Commission, 'Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs' (March 2013)

⁶⁴ Source: *World Bank*

⁶⁵ OECD, 'Back to Work: Sweden Improving the Re-Employment Prospects of Displaced Workers' (2015)

⁶⁶ European Commission, 'Digital Entrepreneurship' (2015)

⁶⁷ McKinsey Global Institute, *A Window of Opportunity for Europe* (June 2015), p. 19; McKinsey Centre for Government, *Education to Employment: Getting Europe's Youth into Work* (January 2014)

- A *public*-spinoff would help digitise and lean administrations across Europe (e.g. improving budget/HR procedures and tax collection efficiency⁶⁸), because empirical studies show that public-sector improvements, in terms of size-efficiency mixes, cause growth gains⁶⁹.
- A *finance*-spinoff would assist Italian banks, through digitised due diligence and transaction channels, to divest their notoriously non-performing loans⁷⁰ (worth 1/5th of Italy's GDP⁷¹), identify healthier debtors and more systematically assess the quality of future deals (to prevent a repeat of Monte Paschi's toxic past acquisitions⁷²).

Two things make *EDED* feasible. First, in a climate of intense regulatory scrutiny, Google seeks to defreeze its relationship with Europe and demonstrate societal value, as evidenced by Google's *Activate, Digitalna Garaža* and *Crescere* digital trainings in Spain, Slovenia and Italy⁷³. The aim is to expand these domestic efforts at EU-level and create greater political visibility.

Second, the partnership could be co-financed by existing channels, notably the flagship European *Social* and *Regional Development* funds, which are investing €30bn until 2020 to fund skills development⁷⁴.

The objective is to create macroeconomic spillovers by boosting Europe's public/private productivity and stimulating European synergies from national industrial policies: Belgium's *Marshall Plan*, Netherlands' *Smart Industry*, France's *Industrie du Futur*, Sweden's *Produktion 2030* and Latvia's *Magic Stardust*.

This digitisation could add €2.5tn to European GDP by 2025⁷⁵, thus enhancing the EU's output legitimacy⁷⁶, while leaving national sovereignties intact.

⁶⁸ McKinsey & Company, *The Road to Improved Compliance: A McKinsey Benchmarking Study fo Tax Administrations 2008-2009* (September 2009)

⁶⁹ R. Barro, 'Government Spending in a Simple Model of Economic Growth', *Journal of Political Economy* (1990), 98; K. Angelopoulos *et al.*, 'Does Public Sector Efficiency Matter? Revisiting the Relation Between Fiscal Size and Economic Growth in a World Sample', *Public Choice* (2008), 137, pp. 245-278

⁷⁰ *The Wall Street Journal*, 'Brexit Exposes Eurozone's Weak Spot: Italy's Banks' (4 July 2016)

⁷¹ *The Economist*, 'The Italian Job: Italy's Teetering Banks Will be Europe's Next Crisis' (9 July 2016)

⁷² *Financial Times*, 'Italian Banks: Essential Repairs' (10 July 2016)

⁷³ Source: *Google Official Blog*

⁷⁴ European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), *Strategic Note 'The Future of Work: Skills and Resilience for a World of Change'* (10 June 2016), Issue 13

⁷⁵ McKinsey Global Institute, *Digital Europe: Realizing the Continent's Potential* (June 2016)

⁷⁶ V. Schmidt, 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union' in *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (eds. E. Jones, A. Menon & S. Weatherill, 2012), p. 662

IV. A Few Appearances, but No Miracle: Energy and Environment

Symptoms

Energy has made a few gauche appearances, such as the Energy Union concept, the 2014 EU agreement to cut emissions by 40% by 2030⁷⁷ or the current renegotiation of the flawed Emissions Trading System⁷⁸. Still no miracle came about.

Poland wants to protect its coal industry at all costs. France has a vested interest to price up CO₂-permits because the state-owned EDF generates most of domestic electricity via nuclear power, which does not produce CO₂.

Also, European states have different political interests due to different energy mixes⁷⁹. Swiss and Austrians consume a quarter of their energy in hydro-electricity while Czech only a hundredth⁸⁰. Sweden depends only 2% on natural gas, Hungary 40%⁸¹. Therefore, the qualified-majority (55% countries, 65% Europeans) required by article 176 TFEU for all energy matters⁸² remains tricky.

Moreover, countries like Norway/Denmark, which have already decoupled material use from emissions (between 1990-2012, Danish GDP went up 40% while emissions went down 25%⁸³), have insufficient incentive to cooperate on current EU green policies, which they have domestically implemented years ago. This renders any European energy reform virtually unfeasible within 3-5 years.

A smarter approach would be to transform the typical end users of these EU policies into its prime drivers and ignite energy-based growth. In other words, the push must come from cities.

⁷⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/index_en.htm

⁷⁸ *The Economist*, 'ETS, RIP?' (20 April 2013)

⁷⁹ European Commission, *Energy Data Analysis by Country* (June 2016 update)

⁸⁰ Schuman Report, *State of the Union 2016*, Exhibit 3.5.2 'Energy Mix of EU States', p. 292

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² Article 176(a), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

⁸³ Danish Ministry of Housing, Urban and Rural Affairs & Danish Energy Agency, *Green Urban Denmark* (September 2014)

Antidote n°3

A five-year, €1bn **Green-to-Grow** city program should be launched.

The utility of the current ‘European Green Capital’ (EGC) competition remains questionable since it simply celebrates already-green-cities (Nijmegen 2018, Essen 2017). It is a bland beauty contest rather than, as in *Little Miss Sunshine*⁸⁴, a valuable become-a-beauty challenge. Therefore, it doesn’t solve the core problem: creating a greener network of European eco-cities.

Each year, *Green-to-Grow* would invite 50 European cities above a certain pollution-level to apply. A taskforce (city mayor, 10 officials from past EGC-winners, 10 national experts), with a Commission grant of €20m per city, will identify targeted solutions, inject best practices from Europe’s greenest cities and sponsor, via public-private partnerships:

- 5,000 free bicycles to the local population and adequate bicycles lanes in consultation with the European Cyclists Federation
- 500 subsidised electric cars similar to Norway’s
- Switch to ultra-green LEDs (20% of humans’ carbon footprint is due to lightning⁸⁵).

Bicycles/electric cars would cut carbon-emissions by 90% in selected cities⁸⁶. LEDs would abate lightning-emissions by 88%⁸⁷. Copenhagen Economics evidences⁸⁸ that such efficiency improvements will save €1,000 per European household, create 2m net jobs across Europe through higher supply in LED/bicycles/electric car industries and save the EU €70bn in health benefits. That is, *Green-to-Grow* would have a quantifiable positive impact on purchasing power, output and public deficits.

All this can increase Europe’s annual growth rate by +0.6% and boost European investments from 18% to 22% GDP⁸⁹. The benefits to climate and growth are clear.

⁸⁴ *Little Miss Sunshine* by J. Dayton & V. Faris (2006)

⁸⁵ APO, ‘Green Productivity’ (September – October 2012), p. 4

⁸⁶ European Cyclists Federation, *Cycle More Often 2 Cool Down the Planet* (November 2011)

⁸⁷ *ibid.* n°83

⁸⁸ European Policy Centre, ‘Towards an Eco-Efficient Europe’ (January 2012)

⁸⁹ C. Jaeger, L. Paroussos, D. Mangalagiu, R. Kupers, A. Mandel & J.D. Tabara, *Synthesis Report ‘A New Growth Path for Europe: Generating Prosperity and Jobs in the Low-Carbon Economy’*, *European Climate Forum* (Potsdam, 2011)

On top of the *Eureka*, job, digital and green antidotes, we recommend a **European Best Practices (EBEP)** sharing scheme, supported by a €2bn EU grant, to reinforce European growth.

The EU would finance each Member State⁹⁰ to set up a National Team (made of officials, citizens and industry leaders) to domestically implement, within two years, European best practices that could increase growth in *their* nation.

The European Council will act as a facilitator and prevent moral hazard. Some of Europe's best practices that the National Teams could import include⁹¹:

- **Poland's** swift recognition-process of informal qualifications to increase employability
- **Germany's** smart trade-logistics to facilitate exports
- **Finland's** efficient teacher-training system
- **France's** effective biotech co-financing
- **UK's** welcome refugee-centres
- **Austria/Switzerland's** flexible dual-apprenticeships

The idea is to stimulate European growth endogenously by leveraging Europe's existing knowledge.

Enough of proposals. On to persuasion.

⁹⁰ As well as Denmark and Switzerland.

⁹¹ McKinsey Global Institute, *A Window of Opportunity for Europe* (June 2015), pp. 16, 17 and 18

PART II

The Art of Appealing Europe's Politics: Make Me Chaste and Celibate, but Not Yet

‘The real act of discovery consists not in finding new lands, but in seeing with new eyes.’

— Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time* (1923)

In order to maximise the feasibility of our economic propositions by 2020, European policymakers need new eyes to rediscover the levers beneath the 2016 political terrain. An eye to envision a revamped narrative to believe in, and another to visualise a smart stakeholder strategy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, both levers have been insufficiently leveraged.

In doing so, Europe should remember Augustine's millennium-old confession: ‘make me chaste and celibate, but not yet’⁹². That is, to ensure swift consensus, it should politically strike a middle note between inter-governmental self-restraint and federalist libido.

I. Trust Me, I'm Not a Doctor: Narrating a New European Story

Symptoms

Since the crisis, Europe has told Europeans ‘trust me’ without the reliability of a doctor who knows her patient. The Brexit haemorrhage is exhibit A. The ‘ever-closer-union’ hubris has slowly morphed into the nemesis of an ever-disparate-unity. With Britain gradually unmoored from European shores, EU leaders *ipso facto* internalise the need for pragmatism.

For example, Mark Rutte (Dutch Prime Minister) recently insisted that The Netherlands ‘doesn't want big treaties anymore’. Donald Tusk (European Council President) echoed this general mood⁹³.

⁹² St Augustine, *Confessions* (400 AD), Book VIII, Chapter 7

⁹³ *The Guardian*, ‘EU Parliament Leader: We Want Britain Out as Soon as Possible’ (24 June 2016)

Wolfgang Schäuble (German Finance Minister) trenchantly concluded⁹⁴: ‘Now is not the time for visions’. If costly – politically and economically – mainstream reforms were the solution, they would have been implemented or succeeded by now.

Jacques Delors, the eminent Commission President in the 1980s, thought that a simple Europe was ‘essential’ because the simpler it is, the likelier Europeans feel close to Europe and can contribute⁹⁵.

It is wise to observe that Europe has been provoked in the *immunological* sense. Its system has been provoked (2008 crisis, migration) and it has sadly activated some of its defence mechanisms (Brexit). However, like in immunology theory⁹⁶, this allows us to reverse-understand the pathology from which Europe suffers: the lack of an appealing narrative for the general population across multiple countries.

This narrative deficiency has produced an existential malaise about the EU’s institutional ability to solve problems, on which populist figures now free-ride⁹⁷. The 2014 EU elections forcefully illustrated it.

The need to address European growth through political means is clear: the Commission’s latest *Economic Forecast* concluded that the ‘main risks’ to Europe’s economy are not economic but ‘political’⁹⁸.

Reconnecting Europeans to Europe is thus the political epicentre of our growth strategy. Our ‘antidotes’ do not fulfil an economic function only, they also serve a political ambition: making Europe closer, simpler and cooler. They will create narrative coherence and be the teeth and life of the new European story.

⁹⁴ *Welt am Sonntag*, ‘Interview of Wolfgang Schäuble’ (9 July 2016)

⁹⁵ J. Delors, *L’unité de l’Europe: un projet pour le 21^e siècle* (‘The Unity of Europe: A Project for the 21st Century’), European College of Parma (5 November 2005), p. 15

⁹⁶ A. Abbas & A. Lichtman, *Cellular and Molecular Immunology* (2014), Chapter 5 ‘Antibodies and Antigens’, p. 87

⁹⁷ C. Mudde, ‘Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?’, *European Journal of Political Research* (2013), 52(1), pp. 1-19

⁹⁸ European Commission, *European Economic Forecast* (Winter 2016), Foreword by Marco Buti (Commission’s Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)

Antidote n°5

Legitimising the EU's existence – relevance – and reframing its political project – likability – are critical to re-baseline project 'Europe'.

To reset the narrative, we should visualise an empty chair at the EU leaders' table in the 'Bunker' summit room, which will represent the notional European citizen and what she would think. Jeff Bezos, Amazon's CEO, uses this technique to represent the typical Amazon customer and deliver superior customer experience⁹⁹.

To institutionalise this, an *ad-hoc* Commissioner for Citizens should be appointed to plant the narrative, channel people's feedback and get them involved (door-to-door volunteers to spread new narrative). This will increase *trust-in-process*, which is a major driver of civic buy-in of any economic programme¹⁰⁰.

Given post-Brexit moods¹⁰¹, the typical European citizen in the chair would likely say 'screw the elites'. The new narrative should then be clear and simple: *Europe is local (utile), simple and cool*. This is important to create 'affective' citizen support¹⁰² and counter the common perception that the EU is useless, internationalist and austere.

This image problem is deep: in Germany, Spain, Greece and France (together 40% of EU citizens), around half of people are unfavourable to the EU¹⁰³.

Instead of the currently defensive approach to Euro-scepticism, Europe should go on the *offensive*:

1) The narrative should be locally toured around European regions by the EU presidents and officials. They could visit, perhaps without a tie, local markets and schools to speak about Europe, *Elixir* and what the EU already does for people (2 out of 3 Europeans are *unaware* of EU-financed projects in their region¹⁰⁴).

Fieldwork should also target the 50+ years segment, which is statistically more Eurosceptic than youngsters¹⁰⁵. This would show greater proximity with people and tame elitism critics.

⁹⁹ *Forbes*, 'Jeff Bezos's Top 10 Leadership Lessons' (4 April 2012)

¹⁰⁰ G. Van Ryzin, 'Outcomes, Process, and Trust of Civil Servants', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* (2011)

¹⁰¹ J. Pisani-Ferry, *France Stratégie*, 'Why Are Voters Ignoring Experts?' (4 July 2016)

¹⁰² D. Easton, 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science* (1975), 5, pp. 435-57

¹⁰³ Pew Research Centre, 'Euroscepticism Beyond Brexit' (7 June 2016), *Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey*, Q10c

¹⁰⁴ European Commission, *Analytical Report: 'Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy'*, (October 2010), p. 8

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.* n°103

2) To rally young people and get ‘likes’, we should create two Instagram/Snapchat accounts to display informal moments of this touring and of #lifeinBrussels.

3) A political drama, similar to *House of Cards* (U.S), *Borgen* (Denmark) and *Les Hommes de l’Ombre* (France), should be created and focus on European politics. Set in present-day Europe, the show would be titled *Europa*, aired on Netflix and fiction the life of three European citizens, a recently-elected European PM and a top Commission speechwriter with politico-romantic theatrics.

Why does everyone know America? Because its famous movies show it. Europeans don’t know the EU well. The purpose is to showcase Europe and, for one episode, to mentally link Europe to Entertainment. Moreover, *Europa* would have a pedagogic twist to explain the EU and shed an optimistic light on its future.

All this is eminently important because, according to political science data¹⁰⁶, the key to make people like organisations (such as the EU) is not to expose great arguments, but to elicit great feelings.

Citizen support is the driving wheel of *Elixir* because it drives parliamentary support¹⁰⁷ thus political willingness to implement the programme at home. Modesty is the motor. We should recognise that Europe cannot deliver every time (a misbelief since the Rome Treaty). States can sometimes do things better because they know their systems better.

Therefore, *Elixir* has an integrationist philosophy (creating European synergies in key sectors) but also makes the EU only a flexible enabler, not the stiff driver of national economies it is currently perceived to be. Europe will respond to people’s *real needs*, such as finding a local job quickly.

To paraphrase Walter Hallstein, the first Commission President in the 1950s, *Elixir* makes Europe the ‘honest broker’ it was designed to be after WWII¹⁰⁸. This is the tune of a powered, palpable and popular Europe. How to sing that song?

¹⁰⁶ D. Westen, *The Political Brain* (2007), Chapter 4: ‘The Emotions Behind the Curtain’, p. 69

¹⁰⁷ G. Mulgan, *The Art of Public Strategy* (2008)

¹⁰⁸ W. Hallstein, *Die europäische Gemeinschaft (The European Community)*, 1973, p. 732

II. After the Melody, the Lyrics: Sensing, Seducing and Securing Stakeholders

The product to sell is *Elixir*, a packaged treatment of five antidotes to fix pre-identified bottlenecks to European growth: *Eureka* for innovation, *JAM-Visas-Erasmus* for jobs, *EDED* for skills/productivity, *Green-to-Grow* for energy efficiency, *Best Practices* systematic share and a repowered Europe Narrative.

Proposing this ‘virgin’ programme is insufficient. It needs spinning to generate real buy-in. To do so, our stakeholder strategy follows marketing’s oldest rule¹⁰⁹: sell what the customer needs.



¹⁰⁹ D. Carnegie, *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (1936); R. Cialdini, *The Psychology of Persuasion* (2009)

STAKEHOLDER SEGMENTATION	CORE INTERESTS	TARGETED STRATEGY
<p>[Approval] [Agreement] [Alliance]</p>		
<p>Commissioners</p>	<p><i>Juncker's growth Guidelines.</i></p> <p><i>Re-legitimation of European project after Brexit.</i></p>	<p>Frame <i>Elixir</i> as a holistic platform to politically legitimise and economically grow Europe (use data cited).</p>
<p>European Council</p> <p>+ EEA: Iceland Liechtenstein Norway</p> <p>+ Switzerland</p>	<p><i>Domestic elections.</i></p> <p><i>National interest/identity (Polish coal, Swiss neutrality, French 35 hours...) i.e. approvability by parliament.</i></p>	<p>On top of stating the tangible economic gains of <i>Elixir</i>, two psychological/behavioural strategies should be used to facilitate European leaders' approval:</p> <p>1) Loss aversion: people prefer not loosing €10 rather than winning €10¹¹⁰.</p> <p>Paradoxically, the emphasis should not be on <i>Elixir's</i> benefits but on its <u>avoidance of costs</u> to domestic interests due to countries' <i>status-quo</i> bias¹¹¹.</p> <p>Indeed, <i>Elixir's</i> political strength is to insulate national interests thanks to its tactical, on-the-ground focus rather than being a bossy law-making agenda.</p> <p>This will fly well with Norway/Switzerland (it doesn't impose new rules on them) as well as Germany/Netherlands (40% of their population want powers back to nations¹¹²).</p>

¹¹⁰ D. Gal, 'A Psychological Law of Inertia and the Illusion of Loss Aversion', *Judgment and Decision Making* (2006), 1(1), pp. 23–32; I. Erev *et al.*, 'Loss Aversion, Diminishing Sensitivity, Effect of Experience on Repeated Decisions', *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making* (2008), 21(5), pp. 575–597

¹¹¹ W. Samuelson & R. Zeckhauser, 'Status Quo Bias in Decision-Making', *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* (1988), 1, pp. 7-59

¹¹² *ibid.* n°99

2) Social norming: people follow others when they think it's the norm¹¹³.

First, identify the likeliest opponent/swing states (e.g. already-green Denmark/Sweden hesitant on *Green-to-Grow* value). Second, opt-them-in with an easy opt-out (*default* opt-ins increase take-up¹¹⁴).

Third, proceed backwards: target likely allies (e.g. Croatia for *Eureka*, France for digital scheme due to their innovation/digital shortages) in order to build a 'coalition norm' in favour of the whole programme package, which hesitant states will be nudged to follow.

751 MEPs

Championing European ideals and political diversity.

Minimising EU-budget expenses.

Lines to take:

- *Elixir* promotes European ideals (see *infra*).
- *Elixir* is cost-efficient, with a €5bn annual cost¹¹⁵ (3% only of the EU's 2017 draft expenses¹¹⁶).

Following Lakoff's 'elephant' communication theory¹¹⁷, *Elixir* should be framed positively ('cost is small') rather than negatively ('it won't cost much') because negating a frame actually activates it.

For example, when Watergate-bashed Nixon declared 'I'm-not-a-crook!', everyone thought of him as a crook because if someone tells you not to think about an elephant, you inevitably start picturing one.

¹¹³ B. Latané, 'The Psychology of Social Impact', *American Psychologist* (1981), 36(4), pp. 343-56; J. Zaki *et al.*, 'Social Influence Modulates the Neural Computation of Value', *Psychological Science* (2011), p. 15; *World Economic Forum*, World Development Report on 'Mind, Society and Behaviour' (2015), p. 6

¹¹⁴ I. Ayres & R. Gertner, 'Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules', *The Yale Law Journal* (1989), 99(1), pp. 87-130; R. Thaler & C. Sunstein, 'Libertarian Paternalism', *The American Economic Review* (2003), 93(2), pp. 175-79

¹¹⁵ Estimated annual breakdown: (€1bn *Eureka*) + (€500m *app development/expansion across Europe*) + (€500m *digital training*) + (€1bn *Green-to-Grow*) + (€2bn *European Best Practices Scheme*) + (€50m *narrative communication*) = **€5.05bn**. This is double the amount of the *Investment Plan for Europe*.

¹¹⁶ (€5.05bn / €134.9bn) * 100 = 3.743%.

¹¹⁷ G. Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant* (2004)

510m Europeans

Feeling a local impact.

Feeling heard.

First, virus-infection research¹¹⁸ should be leveraged: across Europe, information ‘super-spreaders’ (popular opinion-shapers with big networks like Twitterstars) should be identified via social media and paid a small-fee to disseminate the *Elixir* narrative through pictures and posts that fly. We should also ensure the 24 EU languages are used.

Second, make it simple and repeat. Simplicity and repetition smooth approval by creating ‘cognitive ease’ (minimisation of mental efforts)¹¹⁹.

Instead of saying ‘*Elixir* costs 3.7% of EU Budget’, repeat a telling metaphor on air and in print: ‘It’s like taking a spoonful out of a swimming pool’.

Businesses

Political stability.

Profits.

Europe’s top 500 firms have \$7 trillion in net income¹²⁰. The concern is not finding cash, but creating the confidence, context and incentives to invest that cash into the European economy.

Hence to rally Europe’s CEOs to the idea that *Elixir* is that incentive, a video ad should explain the programme’s:

1) Avoidance of unstable treaty-changing/law-making, while giving a new growth framework to Europe: benefits without cost (frame: ‘*Elixir* as political stabiliser’).

2) Leveraging of favourable external factors: e.g. with the ECB’s quantitative easing¹²¹, current low financing costs ease investments into *Eureka/Green-to-Grow* programmes).

¹¹⁸ N. Christakis & J. Fowler, ‘Social Network Sensors for Early Detection of Contagious Outbreaks’, *PLoS One* (2010), 5(9)

¹¹⁹ D. Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow* (2011); R. Zajonc *et al.*, ‘Social Enhancement and Impairment of Performance in the Cockroach’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1969), 13, pp. 83-92

¹²⁰ *Financial Times*, ‘FT 500 Rankings’ (2015)

¹²¹ European Central Bank, ‘Monetary Policy Decisions’ (10 March 2016)

3) Business-friendliness: *Eureka* reinforces R&D in Europe's value chain¹²², digital-savvy employees mean more productive workforce... (*Elixir* as profit enabler').

These advantages should be manifestly *disaggregated*, because humans prefer many small gains over one big gain due to flawed mental accounting¹²³.

Media

Informing.

Selling.

Eureka, *Green-to-Grow*, the job-app are *salient signals* (storyfiable) within the EU informational space. According to agenda-setting and anchoring theories¹²⁴, the media will be primed to see *Elixir* as a sellable story, which will increase the programme's visibility and citizen buy-in: although we can't tell people what to think, we can tell them what to *think about*¹²⁵.

Moreover, to cut across traditional media-platforms and reach the youngest segments, EU presidents could give a joint YouTubers' interview (in the style of Obama's interview¹²⁶) to explain *Elixir*.

¹²² M. Porter, *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance* (1985), Chapter 2: *The Value Chain*, p. 39

¹²³ R. Thaler, 'Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice', *Marketing Science* (1985), 4, pp. 199-214

¹²⁴ F. Strack *et al.*, 'Priming and Communication: Social Determinants of Information Use in Judgments of Life Satisfaction', *European Journal of Social Psychology* (1988), 18, pp. 429-42; N. Schwarz, 'Meta-Cognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making', *Journal of Consumer Psychology* (2004), 14, pp. 332-348; M. McCombs & N. Stroud, 'Psychology of Agenda-Setting Effects: Mapping the Paths of Information Processing', *Review of Communication Research* (2014), 2(1), pp. 68-93

¹²⁵ S. Baran & D. Davies, *Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future* (2003)

¹²⁶ YouTube Interview of President Barack Obama (January 2016): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjl8ka3F6QU>

PART III

The Logic of Timing Europe's Clocks: Everyone's Got a Plan, Until They Get Punched in the Mouth

Mike Tyson's punchy observation strikes at the heart of Europe's timeline: it is impossible to plan any growth programme and avoid all political black swans¹²⁷ until 2020, i.e. impossible to sync Europe's multiple clocks.

In 2016, there are presidential elections in Estonia, Bulgaria, Austria and legislative elections in Lithuania and Romania. In 2017, Germany's federal and France's presidential elections. In 2019, EU elections. Now, Brexit proceedings.

This makes any mainstream legislative agenda, like fiscal harmonisation, effectively undeliverable by 2020¹²⁸.


Although these complex clocks may produce power shifts, our politico-economic programme is designed, by its *oblique approach*, to respect and detour national politics. An anthropological study of the Commission once emphasised that the plurality of politics and cultures is perceived as part and parcel of the European house¹²⁹. Preserving this historical diversity is *Elixir's* steering light.

¹²⁷ N. Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (2007)

¹²⁸ *Even if it were delivered in 2019 after all Europe's elections, the repercussions to growth will probably be felt two years later at the earliest, whilst the aim is to ignite growth quickly by 2020.*

¹²⁹ M. Abélès, I. Bellier & M. McDonald, *Anthropological Approach of the European Commission* (1993), p. 44

Appendix B: Suggested Timeline¹³⁰



¹³⁰ From a pure economic logic, *Elixir* will be most effective if states (Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Romania) pursue structural national reforms until 2020.

Appendix C: Summary



Conclusion.

The proposed elixir is a comprehensive programme to invest €20bn¹³¹ in a precise manner across eight major levers of European growth: jobs, regulation, trade, innovation, cities, digitalisation, services and skills.

We do this without any treaty-changing or law-making. The average duration of the EU's legislative procedure is 30 months¹³². Our programme can be implemented almost immediately.

What is the programme's *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life)? To uphold European values while simplifying, legitimising and transforming Europe into a politically efficacious, economically energetic and likable bloc by 2020.

What is its *raison d'être*? To achieve this without conceptual policies, but with consequential prescriptions to deliver growing equality and quality growth – to give Europe balance and ballast.

It is important to note that the European flag is not a superstate cape to solve everything. We should realise that European solidarity is vital¹³³, and also recognise that decisions ultimately depend on the personalities and perceptions of national leaders. To ignore this is to ignore the warning label on all superhero costumes – ‘*Caution: cape does not enable user to fly.*’



¹³¹ €5.05bn (*annual cost of Elixir*) * 4 (*years until 2020*) = €20.2bn.

¹³² ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’. See European Parliament, *Research Service Blog*, ‘Average Duration and Number of Concluded Ordinary Legislative Procedures’ (25 November 2014).

¹³³ European Parliament, *Mapping the Cost of Non-Europe, 2014-19* (April 2015), p. 4: the cost of ‘non-Europe’ (in terms of the added value of Single Market, European Research Area, Digital Single Market etc) is €1.6 trillion.